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ABSTRACT
We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate
the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We
show that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Clearly, it is likely that when unions bargain with firms over wages they are also influenced by
relative wage considerations.1 Brown et al. (2008), using data collected from 16,000 British
workers, have found evidence that the welfare of a worker is not solely determined by his or her
material circumstances but also depends on his or her relativewage and the rank-ordered position
of his or her wage within a comparison set.2 The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical
study of how relative concerns will affect the outcome of wage negotiations in the presence of
private information in an oligopoly. The utility function of each union captures both the pride
of having higher wages than others and the envy of others having higher wages. To describe
the wage bargaining process, we adopt Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model
Correspondence: Vincent Vannetelbosch, CORE, Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays
34, bte L1.03.01, B-1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Email: vincent.vannetelbosch@uclouvain.be. We
thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on a previous draft. Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana
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1 Hopkins (2008) has provided a survey of different theoretical models of relative concerns and their
relation to inequality. See also Sobel (2005).
2 Clark and Oswald (1996), using data on 5000 Bristish workers, have found evidence that workers’
reported satisfaction levels are inversely related to their comparison wage rates.
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with two-sided incomplete information, which allows the occurrence of strikes at equilibrium.
An increase in unions’ relative concerns has a twofold effect on the strike activity. On the one
hand, it raises the potential payoffs for the union and the firm, and hence longer strikes or
lockouts may be needed for screening the private information. On the other hand, each union is
more inclined to concede and to accept rapidly a smaller wage increase than before since the
smaller increase in wage is compensated by the increased utility due to more pride or less envy.
Depending on which effect dominates, an increase in unions’ relative concerns will either raise
or reduce the strike activity. Notice that, as the number of firms in the industry increases, it
becomes more likely that the strike activity will increase when unions care more about relative
concerns.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the model under complete informa-
tion is presented. Section III is devoted to the case with private information. Section IV
concludes.
II. MODEL
We consider an oligopolistic industry for a single homogeneous product, where the demand
is linear and is given by p = a − q, p is the market price, and q is the aggregate quantity
demanded. Let qi denote the quantity produced by firm i , and let i denote the profit of firm
i , i = 1, . . . , n. There is no entry or threat of entry, and firms are quantity setters (Cournot
competition). Production technology exhibits constant returns to scale with labour as the sole
input and is normalized in such a way that qi = li , where li is the labour input. The total labour
cost to firm i of producing quantity qi is qiwi , where wi is the wage in firm i . Firm i’s profit
is given by i = (p − wi )qi . Firm i is unionized, and enters into a closed-shop agreement with
union i .
II.1 Unions’ preferences
The objective of union i is to maximize the following utility function:
Ui (w1,w2, . . . ,wn) = wi − γ
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
w j − wi
)
(1)
where 1 > γ ≥ 0. In this utility function, γ captures the loss from disadvantageous inequality
(envy) if union i’s wage is below average ( 1
n
∑n
j=1 w j > wi ), or the win from advantageous
inequality (pride) if union i’s wage is above average (wi >
1
n
∑n
j=1 w j ).
3
The union’s utility function given in (1) implies that the union places no value on employment.
Although this may seem implausible, the notion that, in negotiating wages, unions do not take
into account the employment consequences of higher wages has a long tradition, and is often
stated by union leaders (Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, 2005).4 This assumption is made to obtain
closed-form solutions in order to carry out the analysis under incomplete information. Cramton
and Tracy (2003) have concluded that disputes are largely motivated by the presence of private
information and the sharply conflicting interests of the union and the firm over the wage.
3 This utility function is a special case of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequality aversion. We
discuss this model at the end of this section.
4 Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2005) have shown that, if the union is not too powerful, it is optimal for
the union that seeks to maximize the rents to send to the negotiating table delegates who seek to maximize
the wage.
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Interactions between market competition and wage bargaining are analysed according to a
two-stage game. In stage one, wages are negotiated at the firm-level. In stage two, each firm
chooses its output (and hence employment) level, taking as given both the output decisions of
the other firms and the negotiated wages. The model is solved backwards. In the last stage of the
game, the wage levels have already been determined. Firms compete by choosing their outputs
simultaneously to maximize profits, with the price adjusting to clear the market. The unique
Nash equilibrium of this stage game yields
qi (w1, . . . ,wn) =
a − nwi +
∑
j =i wj
n + 1 ; i (w1, . . . ,wn) =
(
a − nwi +
∑
j =i wj
n + 1
)2
for i = 1, . . . , n. The Nash equilibrium outputs of a firm (and hence, the equilibrium level of
employment) are decreasing with its own wage, but are increasing with other firms’ wages and
total industry demand.
The negotiations occur simultaneously in all firms and the agents are unaware of any proposals
made (or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Production and market competition occur
only when either all firms have come to an agreement with their workers, or when some firms
have settled with their unions and the other unions have decided to leave the negotiation forever.
Hence, each union–firm pair takes the decisions of the other pairs as given while conducting its
own negotiation.
II.2 Wage bargaining
Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The
union and the firm make alternate wage offers, with the firm making offers in odd-numbered
periods and the union making offers in even-numbered periods. The length of each period
is . The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an offer.
No limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement
is a possible outcome. The union is assumed to be on strike in every period until an agreement
is reached.
The union and the firm have time preferences with constant discount rates ru > 0 and r f > 0,
respectively. To capture the notion that the time it takes to come to terms is small relative to the
length of the contract, we assume that the time between periods is very small. As the interval
between offers and counteroffers shortens and shrinks to zero, the alternating-offer model has
a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which approximates the Nash bargaining
solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore et al. 1986). Thus the predicted wages are
given by w ∗i = argmax{α · logUi + (1 − α) · logi}, where α ∈ (0, 1) is the union bargaining
power which is equal to r f /(ru + r f ) and the status quo payoffs are zero. Then, the equilibrium
wages (w ∗i ), outputs (q
∗
i ), profits (
∗
i ), and consumer surplus (CS
∗) are
w ∗i =
a(n + γ (n − 1))α
2n2(1 − α) + α(γ (n − 1) + n)
q∗i =
2an2(1 − α)
(n + 1)(2n2(1 − α) + α(γ (n − 1) + n))
∗i =
4a2n4(1 − α)2
(n + 1)2(2n2(1 − α) + α(γ (n − 1) + n))2
CS∗ = 2n
6a2(1 − α)2
(n + 1)2(2n2(1 − α) + α(γ (n − 1) + n))2
C© 2012 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research
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Of course, we have that ∂w ∗i /∂α > 0 (∂U
∗
i /∂α > 0), ∂w
∗
i /∂n < 0 (∂U
∗
i /∂n < 0), ∂
∗
i /∂α < 0,
and ∂∗i /∂n < 0. More interestingly, we find that ∂w
∗
i /∂γ > 0 (∂U
∗
i /∂γ > 0), ∂q
∗
i /∂γ < 0,
∂∗i /∂γ < 0, and ∂CS
∗/∂γ < 0.5
Propositon 1. An increase of unions’ relative concerns increases wages but decreases
outputs, profits, and consumer surplus.
Take as given the wage negotiated in the other firms. As γ increases, each union becomes
less inclined to accept lower wages because of having to suffer from more envy. In addition,
each union is now more persistent to obtain higher wages because of getting more pride. Hence,
the more the union cares about relative concerns the higher the negotiated wages and the lower
the profits of the firm.
III. MAXIMUM DELAY IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT
III.1 Wage bargaining with private information
Both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and Rubinstein’s model predict efficient out-
comes of the bargaining process. In particular, agreement is reached immediately. This is not
true if we introduce incomplete information into the bargaining. In this case, the early rounds
of negotiation are used for information transmission between the two negotiators. We now
suppose that negotiators have private information. Neither negotiator knows the impatience (or
discount rate) of the other party. It is common knowledge that the firm’s discount rate lies
in the range [r Pf , r
I
f ], where 0 < r
P
f ≤ r If , and that the union’s discount rate lies in the range
[r Pu , r
I
u], where 0 < r
P
u ≤ r Iu . The superscripts ‘I’ and ‘P’ identify the most impatient and most
patient types, respectively. The types are independently drawn from the set [r Pj , r
I
j ] according
to the probability distribution pj , for j = u, f . This uncertainty implies bounds on the union’s
bargaining power which are denoted by α = r Pf /(r Iu + r Pf ) and α = r If /(r Pu + r If ). Watson (1998)
has characterized the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) payoffs which may arise in
Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are met) on the
agreements that may be made. The bounds and the PBE payoffs set are determined by the range
of incomplete information and are easy to compute because they correspond to the SPE payoffs
of two bargaining games with complete information. These two games are defined by matching
one player’s most impatient type with the opponent’s most patient type. FromWatson’s analysis,
we have that for any PBE, the payoff of the union belongs to [U ∗i (α),U
∗
i (α)] and the payoff of
the firm belongs to [∗i (α),
∗
i (α)].
III.2 Delay in reaching an agreement
The union is assumed to be on strike in every period until an agreement is reached. The wage
bargaining game may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium.6 In fact,
delay is positively related to the distance between the discount rates of the most and least patient
types of the players. If the range of types is reduced, then this leads to a smaller range of
5 These relationships hold under an alternative specification where unions maximize the surplus and have
relative concerns: Ui (wi , li ,w j , l j ) = wili − γ (w jl j − wili ).
6 Watson (1998) has constructed equilibria with delay in which the types of each player behave identically
(no information is revealed in equilibrium), players use pure strategies, and players make non-serious offers
until some appointed date.
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possible payoffs and less delay. Delay can occur even when the game is close to one of complete
information (as the type distributions converge to point mass distributions).
Since we allow for general distributions over types and wemay have a multiplicity of PBE, we
define strike activity as the maximum delay time in reaching an agreement. It is the minimum
between the maximum real time the union would spend bargaining and the maximum real time
the firm would spend bargaining. Only on average is this measure a good proxy for actual strike
duration.7 The maximum real time the union (firm) would spend bargaining is the time Du
(D f ) such that the union (firm) is indifferent between getting its lower bound PBE payoff at
time 0 and getting its upper bound PBE payoff at time Du (D f ). In the Appendix we derive the
expression for the maximum delay in equilibrium which shows that an agreement is reached in
finite time and that delay time equals zero as incomplete information vanishes (in that r Pj and r
I
j
converge).8 Formally, strike activity is given by
D(γ ) = min {Du(γ ), D f (γ )} (2)
where
Du(γ ) = − 1
r Pu
· log
[
r Pf
r If
· (n + γ (n − 1))r
I
f + 2n2r Pu
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
]
(3)
is the maximum real time the union would spend negotiating, and
D f (γ ) = − 1
r Pf
· log
[(
r Pu
r Iu
)2
·
(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)2]
(4)
is the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating. In fact, Du(γ ) is the maximum real
time the union would spend negotiating if it were of the most patient type. Similarly, D f (γ ) is
the maximum real time the firm would spend negotiating if it were of the most patient type.
So, Du(T ) and D f (T ) are the upper bounds on the maximum time the union of type ru and the
firm of type r f would spend negotiating. Since Du(T ) and D f (T ) are positive, finite numbers,
the maximum real delay in reaching an agreement is finite and converges to zero as r Ij and r
P
j
become close. We get that ∂Du(γ )/∂γ < 0 and ∂D f (γ )/∂γ > 0.
Proposition 2. An increase of unions’ relative concerns decreases the maximum real time
the union would spend negotiating but increases the maximum real time the firm would
spend negotiating.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. An increase of unions’ relative concerns
(γ increases) raises the potential payoffs for the union and the firm, and in expanding the
payoff set (or range of possible payoffs), also increases the scope for delay (longer strikes
or lockouts may be needed for screening the private information). Hence, ∂D f (γ )/∂γ > 0.
However, for the union, there is a second effect at play. When γ increases, taking as given the
wage agreement in the other negotiation, each union is more inclined to concede and to accept
rapidly a smaller wage increase than before since the smaller increase in wage is compensated
by the increased utility due to more pride or less envy. This second effect dominates the first
one. Hence, ∂Du(γ )/∂γ < 0. Since the strike activity, D(γ ), is equal to min{Du(γ ), D f (γ )},
we conclude that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike
activity. Such an ambiguous effect is likely to be observed as long as envy and pride dominate
7 It is not uncommon in the literature on bargaining to analyse the maximum delay before reaching an
agreement. See, for instance, Cramton (1992) and Cai (2003).
8 When the range of types converges to 0, the game reduces to one of complete information and the
agreement is reached without delay.
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TABLE 1
Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
n = 2 n = 5
2 3/2 1 1/2 0 1 1/2 0
γ
rP Du D f Du D f Du D f Du D f Du D f Du D f Du D f Du D f
0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0.16 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 2 0
0.15 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 4 0
0.14 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 5 2 5 2 5 1 5 1
0.13 5 5 6 5 6 4 6 4 6 3 7 2 7 2 7 1
0.12 7 7 7 7 8 6 8 5 9 4 9 3 10 2 10 2
0.11 9 10 10 9 10 8 11 7 11 6 12 4 12 3 13 2
0.10 12 13 13 12 13 10 14 9 15 8 15 6 16 5 17 3
0.09 15 16 16 15 17 14 18 12 19 10 20 8 21 6 21 5
0.08 20 21 21 20 22 18 23 16 24 13 25 10 26 8 27 6
0.07 26 28 27 26 28 24 29 21 31 18 33 14 34 12 36 9
0.06 34 38 35 35 37 32 38 29 40 25 43 20 45 16 47 12
0.05 46 53 48 49 50 45 52 41 55 35 58 28 60 24 63 18
0.04 65 77 67 72 70 67 73 60 77 53 82 43 85 36 89 28
compassion. Indeed, if compassion is as strong as envy and there is no pride as in (5 ), then one
can show that unions’ relative concerns have no effect on the strike activity.
Another result is that the maximum real time the firm would spend bargaining, D f (γ ), is
decreasing in the number of firms: ∂D f (γ )/∂n < 0. This negative relationshipmay be explained
by the following argument. If each union–firm pair expects to be able to alter its relative wage
position in the industry, then each union–firm pair has some incentive to cut its wage in order
to gain a larger share of the product market. This incentive increases with the number of firms
operating in the industry. As n becomes large, the wage outcome tends to be close to the
reservation wage and the strike activity tends to vanish.
We now provide an example of the maximum delay. In this example, let r Pf = r Pu = r P,
r If = r Iu = r I, r I = 0.36 − r P with r P ∈ [0.04, 0.18]. Table 1 gives the integer part of the
maximum delay for the different values of the parameter γ and for n = 2 or n = 5. We can
interpret r j as the annual discount rate and the numbers in Table 1 as the maximum number
of days needed to reach an agreement. Indeed, the integer part of the maximum delays for
 = 1/365 are exactly the numbers in Table 1.9 We observe that (i) the real delay time in reaching
an agreement is not negligible: many bargaining rounds may be needed in equilibrium before an
agreement is reached; (ii) D f (Du) is increasing (decreasing) with γ but decreasing (increasing)
with n; (iii) Du and D f are increasing with the amount of private information |r Pj − r Ij |;
(iv) the maximum delay D(γ ) = min{Du(γ ), D f (γ )} is increasing with γ when γ is small, and
may decrease with γ when γ is becoming large; and (v) the maximum delay D(γ ) decreases
sharply with n. For instance, take r P = 0.05. For n = 2, we observe that D(1/2) = D f (1/2) =
41, D(1) = D f (1) = 45, D(3/2) = Du(3/2) = 48, and D(2) = Du(2) = 46. In addition, we
notice that D(1) = 45 for n = 2 but D(1) = 28 for n = 5. Results (i), (ii) and (iii) hold in
general.
9 The data in Table 1 seem consistent with US strike durations as reported in Cramton and Tracy (1994).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have considered a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly.We
have investigated the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the
strike activity. We have shown that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous
effect on the strike activity.
IV.1 Alternative unions’ preferences
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have proposed a model of inequality aversion:
Ui (w1,w2, . . . ,wn) = wi − γ
n
n∑
j=1
max{w j − wi , 0} − β
n
n∑
j=1
max{wi − w j , 0}
where they assume that γ ≥ β and that β satisfies 1 > β ≥ 0. The parameter γ captures the
envy. If the parameter β is positive, then it captures the compassion. But if β is negative, then
it captures the pride.10 One can see that if β is negative and equal to −γ , then the Fehr and
Schmidt’s model reduces to the utility function given in (1) where pride is as strong as envy and
there is no compassion.11 It can be shown that, as long as envy and pride dominate compassion,
our main results hold: unions’ relative concerns lead to higher wages but have an ambiguous
effect on the strike activity.
Notice that, if β is positive and equal to γ , then the Fehr and Schmidt model reverts to Bolton
and Ockenfels’ (2000) model of inequality aversion:
Ui (w1,w2, . . . ,wn) = wi − γ
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
w j − wi
)2
(5)
This form of utility function implies that an increase in γ does not give more incentives to
each union for accepting higher wages or for accepting lower wages. Hence, if compassion is as
strong as envy and there is no pride as in (5), then one can show that the symmetric equilibrium
wages do not depend on the parameter γ .
IV.2 Product differentiation and market competition
We have assumed that firms were competing a` la Cournot and were producing homogeneous
goods. Product differentiation does not qualitatively affect our results about the effect of unions’
relative conerns on wage negotiations. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2003) have shown that,
when unions maximize rents, wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product
differentiation, and the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.
However, an increase in market competition does not always reduce the strike activity. For
instance, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2010) have shown that, from an initial situation of
two-way intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the strike
activity. But, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous effect on the wage and the strike
activity.
10 Using data from experiments on two-person bargaining, De Bruyn and Bolton (2008) have found that
the positive reciprocity assumption of the Fehr–Schmidt model (β > 0) is violated.
11 Brown et al. (2008) have studied how British workers do make wage comparisons. Their results support
rivalrous preferences rather than inequity aversion. So, workers seem to feel envy or pride rather than envy
or compassion when making wage comparisons.
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APPENDIX: MAXIMUM DELAY
The negotiation goes as in Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining model. The firm
and the union have time preferences with constant discount factors δ f ∈ (0, 1) and δu ∈ (0, 1),
respectively. It is assumed that each union–firm pair i takes the other wage settlements
w−i = (w1, . . . ,wi−1,wi+1, . . . ,wn) as given during the negotiation. For any wage bargaining
which leads to an agreement wi at period n, δnf i (wi , li (wi ,w−i )) and δ
n
uUi (wi ,w−i ) are,
respectively, firm i’s payoff and union i’s payoff. For any wage bargaining which leads
to perpetual disagreement, disagreement payoffs are set to zero. As in Binmore et al.
(1986), the SPE wage outcome is such that i (wiu, li (wiu,w−i )) = δ f i (wi f , li (wi f ,w−i )) and
Ui (wi f ,w−i ) = δuU (wiu,w−i ), where wiu is the SPE wage outcome if the union makes the first
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wage offer, and wi f is the SPE wage outcome if the firm makes the first offer. Since the union
makes the first offer, the unique symmetric SPE wages are given by
w ∗i (δu, δ f ) =
a(γ (n − 1) + n)[(1 − δ f )(γ (n − 1) + n) − (1 − δu)n2(√δ f − δ f )]
	
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and with
	 = (1 − δ f )(γ (n − 1) + n)2 + δ f (1 − δu)n2[2(γ (n − 1) + n) − (1 − δu)n2]
This SPE wage is also the SPE payoff, U ∗i (δu, δ f ), and from which we get the SPE profits,
∗i (δu, δ f ) =
a2(1 − δu)2n4
[
(γ (n − 1) + n)(√δ f − δ f )+ δ f (1 − δu)n2]2
(n + 1)2	2
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose now that the players have private information. They are uncertain about each other’s
discount factors. Player j’s discount factor lies in the range [δIj , δ
P
j ], where 0 < δ
I
j ≤ δPj < 1. The
types are independently drawn from the interval [δPj , δ
I
j ] according to the probability distribution
pj , for j = u, f .
Lemma 1. Consider the wage bargaining with private information in which the distributions
p f and pu are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks to zero. For any
perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payoff of the union i belongs to [U ∗i (δ
I
u, δ
P
f ),U
∗
i (δ
P
u , δ
I
f )]
and the payoff of the firm i belongs to [∗i (δ
P
u , δ
I
f ),
∗
i (δ
I
u, δ
P
f )].
This lemma is not a direct corollary to Watson’s (1998) Theorem 1 because Watson’s work
focuses on linear preferences, but the analysis can be modified to handle the present case. Since
we allow for general probability distributions over discount factors, multiplicity of PBE is not
an exception.
The maximum number of bargaining periods the union would spend negotiating,
I (mu(γ )), is given by U ∗i (δ
I
u, δ
P
f ) = (δPu )mu (γ )U ∗i (δPu , δIf ), from which we obtain mu(γ ) =
(log(δPu ))
−1 log[U ∗i (δ
I
u, δ
P
f )/U
∗
i (δ
P
u , δ
I
f )]. Notice that I (m
u(γ )) is simply the integer part ofmu(γ ).
It is customary to express the players’ discount factors in terms of discount rates, ru and r f ,
and the length of the bargaining period, , according to the formula δ j = exp(−r j). With
this interpretation, player j’s type is identified with the discount rate r j , where r j ∈ [r Pj , r Ij ]. We
thus have that δIj = exp(−r Ij) and δPj = exp(−r Pj ). Note that r Ij ≥ r Pj since greater patience
implies a lower discount rate. As  approaches zero, using l’Hopital’s rule we obtain that
Du(γ ) = lim
→0
(mu(γ ) · ) = − 1
r Pu
· log
[
r Pf
r If
· (n + γ (n − 1))r
I
f + 2n2r Pu
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
]
which is a positive, finite number. Notice that Du(γ ) converges to zero as r Pj and r
I
j become
close. We have
∂Du(γ )
∂γ
= −2(n − 1)n
2
(
r If r
I
u − r Pf r Pu
)
(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
)(
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)
r Pu
< 0
and
∂Du(γ )
∂n
= 2n((n − 2)γ + n)(r
I
f r
I
u − r Pf r Pu )(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
) (
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)
r Pu
> 0
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The maximum number of bargaining periods the firm would spend negotiating,
I (m f (γ )), is given by ∗i (δ
P
u , δ
I
f ) = (δPf )m f (γ ) · ∗i (δIu, δPf ), from which we obtain m f (γ ) =
(log(δPf ))
−1 log
[
∗i (δ
P
u , δ
I
f )/
∗
i (δ
I
u, δ
P
f )
]
, and as  approaches zero,
D f (γ ) = lim
→0
(
m f (γ ) · ) = − 1
r Pf
· log
[(
r Pu
r Iu
)2
·
(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)2]
which is a positive, finite number. We have
∂D f (γ )
∂γ
= 4(n − 1)n
2
(
r If r
I
u − r Pf r Pu
)
(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
)(
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)
r Pf
> 0
and
∂D f (γ )
∂n
= −4n((n − 2)γ + n)
(
r If r
I
u − r Pf r Pu
)
(
(n + γ (n − 1))r Pf + 2n2r Iu
)(
(n + γ (n − 1))r If + 2n2r Pu
)
r Pf
< 0
The strike activity (i.e. the maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement) is given by
D(γ ) = min {Du(γ ), D f (γ )}.
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